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Abstract
The logic S4LP combines the modal logic S4 with the justification logic LP. This is the
case both axiomatically and semantically, though of course the real story is in the details. We
introduce a simple restriction on the behavior of constants in S4LP, a restriction that has no
effect on the LP sublogic. With this assumed, some very powerful derived rules are established.
Then these are used to show we have completeness relative to a semantics having what we call
the local realizability property. This means that at each world of such a model, for each formula
true at that world there is a realization also true at that world, where a realization is the result
of replacing all modal operators with explicit justification terms. This is part of a attempt to
understand the deeper aspects of Artemov’s Realization Theorem, though it is not yet clear just
how the results obtained here relate to that theorem.
1 Introduction
Logics of knowledge, Hintikka style, are long familiar tools, [10]. Recently a family of justification
logics has been created. In these logics, instead of a single modal operator, known, there is an infinite
structured family of explicit reasons according to which something is known. There are justification
logic analogs of several standard single-knower Hintikka style logics, and work is proceeding on
multiple-knower versions. Connections between the Hintikka versions and the explicit versions are
quite close, via Realization Theorems. Essentially they say that any theorem of one of the standard
Hintikka style logics of knowledge can be realized, its knowledge operators can be replaced with
explicit justifications to produce a theorem of the corresponding explicit logic of knowledge. Thus
the usual knowledge operators carry hidden explicit content.
Justification logics began with an analog of S4, due to Sergei Artemov, [1]. The original moti-
vation was to supply a constructive, arithmetic semantics for propositional intuitionistic logic, thus
completing a project begun by Go¨del. Artemov succeeded in this. Consequently the justification
logic created was called LP, standing for “logic of proofs,” where explicit justifications were thought
of as representing formal arithmetic proofs. It was soon realized that proofs were only one kind
of justification, and LP was one of a family of similar logics. Nonetheless in order to keep the
discussion relatively manageable here, I will frame the entire discussion in terms of LP, thinking of
it as a representative member of the family but having historical precedence. What is developed
here, in fact, applies to a range of modal and justification logics.
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For LP, the Realization Theorem makes a fundamental connection with S4. It says that each
theorem of S4 has a realization—there is a replacement of modal operators with explicit justification
terms that produces a theorem of LP. (The converse is also true, and trivial.) Indeed, a realization
can be chosen that is normal, negative occurrences of necessity can be replaced with distinct
variables. Moreover a realization can be produced constructively, based on a proof of the modal
version in S4. Given this fundamental relationship between S4 and LP, it is natural to consider a
logic that combines features of LP and S4, so that both explicit and implicit notions of knowledge
are present. This has been done, with the resulting logic known as S4LP, [4, 5]. Axiomatically, one
simply provides the machinery of S4, the machinery of LP, and a connecting axiom saying that
explicit knowledge implies implicit knowledge (there is a full formulation in Section 3.1). S4LP
is a conservative extension of both S4 and LP. The Realization Theorem becomes a result about
this single logic, rather than one that connects two different ones. Unfortunately, the only proofs
known for the single-logic version of the Realization Theorem detour through the older proofs,
via conservativity. (Unfortunately too, this paper does not shed any fresh light on this important
issue.)
A Hintikka/Kripke semantics for S4 is standard and well-known. In [6, 8] a semantics for LP
was presented, combining some justification logic machinery originating in [11] with the usual S4
semantics. This semantics has been adapted to S4LP in two quite distinct ways. First, one can
use the LP semantics without change, since there is an underlying Kripke structure present for
the interpretation of the modal operator. Axiomatic soudness was shown in [4, 5] and a complete-
ness theorem is in [7]. The second semantics is the single agent version of an n-agent logic of
knowledge with explicit common knowledge, [2, 3]. In this, separate accessibility relations are used
for the modal knowledge operator and for the explicit justification terms. Again, soundness and
completeness results have been shown.
We are not concerned here with the two-accessibility-relation version of S4LP semantics. That
has applications to common knowledge. Instead we are concerned with the single accessibility
relation version, as investigated in [4, 5, 7]. In this semantics justifications can be thought of as
supplying an analysis of an individual’s knowledge, and the connection between justifications and
the modal/knowledge operator can be expected to be quite close.
Let us say an S4LP model meets the local realizability condition provided, at each possible world
of the model, each formula that is true at that world has a realization that is also true at that world
(normaliity of realizations is not required). The main result of this paper is that axiomatic S4LP
is complete with respect to models meeting the local realizability condition, provided a certain
condition is placed on the constant specifications allowed. What was called strong completeness
for LP in [8] is an easy corollary, thus giving strong completeness two quite distinct proofs.
We first present the basics of LP and S4LP, axiomatically and semantically. Next, subject to
a restriction on constant specifications, some proof-theoretic results are shown for S4LP. Finally,
we use these results to show completeness of S4LP relative to a semantics in which models meet a
local realizability condition.
I want to thank Sergei Artemov for comments on an earlier draft of this paper.
2 The Logic LP
Since we will be building directly on it, we begin with a brief sketch of the oldest of the justification
logics, LP, from [1]. First, the language and an axiom system, and then a standard semantics.
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2.1 LP Axiomatically
Justification terms or proof terms are built up from variables, x1, x2, . . . , and constant symbols,
c1, c2, . . . . They are built up using the following operation symbols: + and ·, both binary, and !,
unary. These are used as infix and prefix, respectively. The reader is referred to [1] and to [9] for
a discussion of the intended meaning of these operation symbols.
Formulas are built up from propositional letters, P1, P2, . . . , and a falsehood constant, ⊥, using
⊃ in the usual way, together with an additional rule of formation, t :X is a formula provided t
is a justification term and X is a formula. One reads it as “t is a justification for X.” Other
propositional connectives are introduced as abbreviations.
Axioms for LP are as follows; more properly these are axiom schemes.
Classical Axioms: all tautologies
Truth Axioms: t:X ⊃ X
+ Axioms: t:X ⊃ (t+ u):X
u:X ⊃ (t+ u):X
· Axioms: t:(X ⊃ Y ) ⊃ (u:X ⊃ (t · u):Y )
! Axioms: t:X ⊃!t:t:X
We have two rules, one standard, one not.
Modus Ponens:
X X ⊃ Y
Y
Axiom Necessitation: If X is an axiom and c is a constant:
c:X
A constant specification C is an assignment of axioms to constants. We can take it to be a set
whose members are of the form c:X, where c is a constant andX is an axiom. A proofmeets constant
specification C provided that whenever c:X is introduced using the Axiom Necessitation rule, then
X is an axiom that C assigns to constant c. A constant specification can be given ahead of time, or
can be created during the course of a proof. In this paper we will assume a constant specification
has been fixed ahead of time. Various conditions can be imposed on constant specifications. A
constant specification is axiomatically appropriate if all instances of axiom schemes have proof
constants—in this paper this will always be assumed. Another common condition is being injective,
which means that at most one formula is associated with each constant. We will need a condition,
given in Section 4, that conflicts with injectivity, but which is nonetheless natural to consider.
2.2 LP Semantics
The semantics commonly used for LP comes from [8], and amounts to a blending of an earlier
semantics from [11] with the usual Hintikka style semantics for logics of knowledge. A model is
M = 〈G,R,A,V〉, where 〈G,R〉 is a frame in the usual sense, with R a reflexive and transitive
relation on G. V maps propositional variables to subsets of G. The item not standard in Kripke
models is A, which is an admissible evidence function. For each justification term t and formula X,
A(t,X) is some subset of G. The intuition is, A(t,X) is intended to be the set of worlds at which
t is considered to be admissible evidence for X. Note that this does not mean certain evidence—
just evidence that is relevant. Admissible evidence functions must meet certain conditions—for
example, agreeing with a given constant specification. We give these conditions next. (In earlier
work a mapping E , called an evidence function, was used in place of A. It assigned to each possible
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world Γ and to each justification t a set of formulas. The change in notation is essentially cosmetic,
and is part of a move toward uniformity in the area of justification logics.)
Constant Specification Condition For the given constant specification C, if c :X ∈ C then
A(c,X) = G. If this condition is met, we say A meets constant specification C.
· Condition A(s,X ⊃ Y ) ∩ A(t,X) ⊆ A(s · t, Y ).
+ Condition A(s,X) ∪ A(t,X) ⊆ A(s+ t,X).
R Closure Condition ΓR∆ and Γ ∈ A(t,X) imply ∆ ∈ A(t,X).
! Condition A(t,X) ⊆ A(!t, t:X).
Let M = 〈G,R,A,V〉 be an LP model. The notation M,Γ  X is read: formula X is true at
world Γ ∈ G, of LP model M. The conditions for it are as follows.
Atomic Condition For a propositional letter P , M,Γ  P if Γ ∈ V(P ).
Classical Conditions M,Γ  X ⊃ Y iff M,Γ 6 X or M,Γ  Y . Also M,Γ 6 ⊥.
Justification Condition M,Γ  t:X iff Γ ∈ A(t,X) and M,∆  X for all ∆ ∈ G with ΓR∆.
We say X is true at world Γ if M,Γ  X, and otherwise X is false at Γ. X is valid in a model
M if X is true at every world of it.
The justification condition above says we have t:X at Γ if X is knowable at Γ in the Hintikka
sense, and t is admissible evidence for X at Γ. If we think of Hintikka semantics as capturing the
idea of true belief, then what the present machinery captures is justified true belief.
The semantics as just described is sometimes called the weak model semantics. There is a
stronger version. A model M is said to be fully explanatory provided, if M,∆  X for all ∆ ∈ G
with ΓR∆ then there is some justification t such that M,Γ  t:X. More informally, M is fully
explanatory provided knowability of X at Γ (in the Hintikka semse) implies there is a justification
for X at Γ. The fully explanatory condition will be examined in a bit more detail in Section 6.
In [8] soundness and completeness was shown, in the following sense. If C is an axiomatically
appropriate constant specification, then X has an axiomatic proof using C if and only if X is valid
in every weak LP model meeting C if and only if X is valid in every strong LP model meeting C.
While strong models are interesting, all applications of the semantics have so far only needed
the weak model semantics. This is a puzzling circumstance, which the results of this paper will
only make more puzzling.
3 The Logic S4LP
The logics LP and S4 are connected intimately via the Realization Theorem, as noted in the
Introduction. Consequently it is natural to consider a logic combining the two, and this is S4LP,
originating in [4, 5]. This section presents the usual formulation, axiomatically and via one of the
two standard semantics.
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3.1 S4LP Axioms
First, the language of LP is extended with the formation rule: if X is a formula, so is X. Next,
the axiomatization of LP as given in Section 2.1 is extended with S4 machinery, and a connecting
axiom.
 Axioms: X ⊃ X
(X ⊃ Y ) ⊃ (X ⊃ Y )
X ⊃ X
Connecting Axiom: t:X ⊃ X
The usual necessitation rule is added.
 Necessitation: XX
Finally, it is assumed that the LP Axiom Necessitation rule also applies to the new axioms just
added, and that constant specifications also take these new axioms into account.
We should note that  Necessitation can be shown to be a redundant rule, but doing so involves
proving an Internalization Theorem, whose statement and proof we skip here.
3.2 An S4LP Semantics
As was noted in the introduction, there are two quite different kinds of semantics for S4LP, with
different motivations. One, presented in [2, 3], allows not just one but multiple agents, each with
its own knowledge operator, Ki, but with justifications being meaningful to all and playing the
role of justified common knowledge. If there is a single agent, the logic reduces to S4LP. In the
corresponding semantics, one has multiple accessibility relations, one for each agent, and one for
justification terms. In the S4LP case there is, in effect, a single agent and so there are two relations,
one used Hintikka style to supply an interpretation for , the other, combined with an admissible
evidence function, is used as in Section 2.2. For this semantics, both weak and strong completeness
theorems are provable. However, this is not the semantics that will concern us here, and it will not
be mentioned further.
The semantics that interests us in this paper understands knowledge as having an explicit
(justification term) aspect and an implicit (modal) aspect. Justification terms provide an analysis
of our knowledge, rather than being the items of knowledge we share with other agents. This
approach originated in [4, 5, 7]. In this version a single accessibility relation is used for both
implicit and explicit knowledge. We now specify this semantics a bit more properly.
First, LP models are fundamental, and these are exactly as in Section 2.2. This provides the
semantics for justification terms. But since we are using an extended language now, we can also
adopt the following, familiar from modal logic.
Necessitation Condition M,Γ  X iff M,∆  X for all ∆ ∈ G with ΓR∆.
In other words, justification terms are interpreted using the single accessibility relation and the
admissible evidence function, while the modal operator uses the accessibility relation but does not
take the admissible evidence function into account. Note that the Justification Condition now can
be given a somewhat simpler expression: M,Γ  t:X iff Γ ∈ A(t,X) and M,Γ  X.
As with LP itself, we can still introduce notions of weak and strong models, but now the Fully
Explanatory condition is simpler to state: for each possible world Γ and for each formula X,
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if M,Γ  X then there is some justification term t such that M,Γ  t :X. Equivalently, if
M,Γ  X then there is some justification term t such that Γ ∈ A(t,X).
Axiomatic soundness comes from [4, 5]. Completeness of S4LP with respect to the weak model
semantics for S4LP was shown in [7]. Completeness with respect to the strong model semantics,
with models satisfying the fully explanatory condition, is an open problem in full generality. Here
it will be a special case of a more general result, but the general result will be proved subject to a
special condition on constant specifications.
4 Some Derived S4LP Rules
The rules presented here will form part of the basis for our S4LP completeness proof in the next
section. We must, however, impose a restriction on constant specifications, one that is at odds with
injectivity. In order to state the restriction simply, we begin with the notion of replacing terms
containing a variable with a  operator.
Definition 4.1 Let Z be a formula of S4LP, and let x be a variable. by Z(x/) we mean the
result of replacing every justification term in Z that contains x with . More specifically:
P (x/) = P for P atomic
[X ⊃ Y ](x/) = [X(x/) ⊃ Y (x/)]
[X](x/) = [X(x/)]
[t:X](x/) =
{
t:[X(x/)] if x does not occur in t
[X(x/)] if x occurs in t
The following Lemma essentially says why we are interested in this notion. It exemplifies the
symmetry inherent in S4LP.
Lemma 4.2 If Z is an axiom of S4LP, so is Z(x/) for every variable x.
Proof We do one case as an example, and leave the others to you. Consider the axiom t:X ⊃
(t+ u):X. For it, we have the following three subcases.
1. x does not occur in either t or u. Then [t:X ⊃ (t+u):X](x/) = [t:X(x/) ⊃ (t+u):X(x/)],
which is also a + axiom.
2. x occurs in u but not in t. Then [t:X ⊃ (t+ u):X](x/) = [t:X(x/) ⊃ X(x/)], which is
a connecting axiom.
3. x occurs in t. Then [t:X ⊃ (t+ u):X](x/) = [X(x/) ⊃ X(x/)], a classical axiom.
Now we give our constant specification restriction.
Definition 4.3 ( Closed) Let C be a constant specification for S4LP. We say C is  closed
provided that whenever c:Z ∈ C then also c:Z(x/) ∈ C, for each variable x.
Note that a constant specification that is  closed cannot be injective (though it may be when
restricted to LP formulas, not containing ). Here is the main result concerning  closed constant
specifications.
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Theorem 4.4 Suppose the constant specification C is  closed. If Z is provable in S4LP using
constant specification C, so is Z(x/), for every variable x.
Proof By induction on axiomatic proof length. Lemma 4.2 takes care of axioms. Modus ponens
and  necessitation are straightforward. Axiom necessitation is covered by the assumption that
the constant specification is  closed.
Note that if we do not assume the constant specification is  closed, it is still the case that if
Z is provable in S4LP, so is Z(x/), but using a different constant specification.
Corollary 4.5 Assuming a constant specification that is  closed, the following is a derived rule
of S4LP. If x does not occur in A or B:
x:A ⊃ B
A ⊃ B
This corollary points out a similarity in behavior between the  operator in S4LP and the
existential quantifier in first-order logic. This similarity has been an important motivating factor
in the development of justification logics.
5 Completeness
We begin with a proper definition of local realizability, and a statement of the completeness theorem
whose proof will occupy the rest of this section. It should be noted that the completeness argument
has similarities with one often used for first-order modal logic with the Barcan formula.
Definition 5.1 For a formula X of S4LP, a realization is a formula X ′ whose structure is like
that of X, but in which every occurrence of  has been replaced with a justification term. More
precisely we have the following, in which the shorter term “realizes” has been used for readability.
P realizes P if P is atomic
X ′ ⊃ Y ′ realizes X ⊃ Y if X ′ realizes X and Y ′ realizes Y
t:X ′ realizes t:X if X ′ realizes X
t:X ′ realizes X if t is a term and X ′ realizes X
Note that this definition extends the usual notion of realization. Ordinarily it is S4 formulas that
are realized, while the definition given above includes a case covering justification terms which are
not part of the language of S4. Also note, we are not considering normal realizations.
Definition 5.2 Let M = 〈G,R,A,V〉 be an S4LP model. We say it meets the local realizability
condition provided: for every world Γ ∈ G and for every S4LP formula X, if M,Γ  X then there
is some realization X ′ of X such that M,Γ  X ′.
Here is the completeness result that will be proved in the remainder of the section.
Theorem 5.3 Let C be a constant specification that is  closed (Definition 4.3). If Z0 is not
provable using this constant specification, then Z0 is false at some world of an S4LP model meeting
this constant specification and meeting the local realizability condition.
8 Melvin Fitting
We begin with some standard items. We will not need to restrict things to a  closed constant
specification for a while, so for the time being just assume all proofs use a constant specification C
that may or may not meet this condition.
For a set S of formulas and a single formula X, we write S ` X if there is some finite subset
{Y1, . . . , Yn} of S such that (Y1∧ . . .∧Yn) ⊃ X is a theorem of S4LP. Note that with this definition,
the deduction theorem is immediately true. We say S is inconsistent if S ` ⊥, and consistent if
it is not inconsistent. As with the deduction theorem, compactness is also immediate. Maximal
consistency has its usual meaning.
Definition 5.4 Let X be a formula of S4LP, and assume an occurrence of  in X has been
designated. Let t be a justification term. By X(t) we mean the result of replacing the designated
occurrence of  in X with t.
For instance, say X is (P ⊃ x: Q) ⊃ R and the designated occurrence of  is marked with
a dot. Then X(t) = (P ⊃ x:t:Q) ⊃ R. The notation X(t) is really incomplete, in the sense
that which occurrence of  in X is designated is understood, and is not represented in the notation
itself.
Definition 5.5 We say a set S of S4LP formulas has the  instantiation property provided, for
every formula X, if S ∪ {X} is consistent, then for each designated occurrence of  in X there is
some term t such that S ∪ {X(t)} is also consistent.
Trivially an inconsistent set has the  instantiation property, though this vacuous fact will have
no use for us. More importantly, if S is not just consistent but maximally so, then being consistent
with S is equivalent to being a member of S. So for maximally consistent sets the  instantiation
property becomes: if X ∈ S then for each designated occurrence of  in X there is some t such
that X(t) ∈ S. This, finally, is what we will need, but the more general version plays an essential
role along the way.
Definition 5.6 Let S be a set of S4LP formulas. S] is defined to be {X | X ∈ S}.
It is common in constructing canonical modal models to take as possible worlds all maximally
consistent sets, and for two such sets, to say ∆ is accessible from Γ if Γ] ⊆ ∆. Here, in addition
to maximal consistency, we will require sets serving as possible worlds to have the  instantiation
property. We begin with a result connecting that notion with the operation just defined.
Proposition 5.7 Suppose S is a maximally consistent set of S4LP formulas that has the  instan-
tiation property. Then S] also has the  instantiation property.
Proof Assume the hypothesis. Let X be an S4LP formula in which an occurrence of  has been
designated, and suppose S] ∪ {X} is consistent. We will show that for some t, S] ∪ {X(t)} is
consistent. In doing this it will be convenient to use the modal operator ♦, which has its usual
definition, ♦Z = ¬¬Z; indeed negation itself is not primitive, ¬Z = (Z ⊃ ⊥).
Since S]∪{X} is consistent, so is S∪{♦X} by the following argument. If it were not consistent,
S,♦X ` ⊥, and so S ` (♦X ⊃ ⊥), or equivalently, S ` ¬X. Since S is maximally consistent,
¬X ∈ S, hence ¬X ∈ S], so S] ∪ {X} would not have been consistent.
Since S has the  instantiation property, for some justification term t, S∪{♦X(t)} is consistent.
Finally, since S ∪ {♦X(t)} is consistent, it follows that so is S] ∪ {X(t)}, which finishes the
argument. Again the verification is a proof by contradiction. Suppose S]∪{X(t)} is not consistent.
Then S], X(t) ` ⊥, and so S] ` ¬X(t). Then for some Y1, . . . , Yn ∈ S], the formula (Y1∧ . . .∧Yn) ⊃
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¬X(t) is provable. It follows using the Rule of Necessitation and standard modal theorems, that
(Y1 ∧ . . . ∧ Yn) ⊃ ¬X(t) is provable. Since Y1, . . . , Yn ∈ S], we must have Y1, . . . ,Yn ∈ S,
and since S is maximally consistent, we must also have ¬X(t) ∈ S, contradicting the fact that
S ∪ {¬¬X(t)} is consistent.
Next we address the problem of extending a set that has the  instantiation property to a
maximally consistent set that still has this property. First a Lemma, and then the main item.
Lemma 5.8 Suppose S is a set of S4LP formulas that has the  instantiation property, and F is
a finite set of formulas. If S ∪ F is consistent then S ∪ F also has the  instantiation property.
Proof Let X be an S4LP formula in which an occurrence of  has been designated. Assume that
S ∪ F ∪ {X} is consistent. We will show that for some t, S ∪ F ∪ {X(t)} is also consistent. The
argument is very simple.
Say F = {Y1, . . . , Yn}. Then S∪{Y1∧ . . .∧Yn∧X} is consistent. Since S has the  instantiation
property, for some t we have that S∪{Y1∧. . .∧Yn∧X(t)} is consistent, using the original designated
occurrence of  in X. But this implies that S ∪ F ∪ {X(t)} is consistent.
Proposition 5.9 If S is a consistent set of S4LP formulas that has the  instantiation property,
then S can be extended to a set that is maximally consistent and has the  instantiation property.
Proof Assume S is consistent and has the  instantiation property. We extend S using a modified
version of the usual Lindenbaum construction. Enumerate the formulas of S4LP, say X0, X1, . . . .
Then define a sequence of sets of formulas, S0, S1, . . . , in which each set extends its predecessor,
is consistent, and has the  instantiation property. The definition is as follows.
To start, S0 = S.
Suppose Sn has been defined, is consistent, and has the  instantiation property. If Sn ∪ {Xn}
is not consistent, set Sn+1 = Sn. Otherwise, proceed as follows. Xn has a finite number of 
occurrences, say k of them. Choose one of them as designated. Sn ∪ {Xn} is consistent and,
by Lemma 5.8, it has the  instantiation property. Then, using the designated occurrence of ,
there must be some justification term t such that Sn ∪ {Xn, X1n} is consistent, where X1n = Xn(t).
By Lemma 5.8 this set too has the  instantiation property. Now repeat this with a different
designated occurrence of  in Xn, getting a set Sn ∪ {Xn, X1n, X2n}, consistent and with the 
instantiation property. And so on for each of the k occurrences of  in Xn. Let Sn+1 = Sn ∪
{Xn, X1n, X2n, . . . , Xkn}.
Let S = S0 ∪S1 ∪S2 ∪ . . .. By a standard argument, S is maximally consistent. But also it has
the  instantiation property by the following argument. Suppose X is a formula with a designated
occurrence of , and suppose S ∪ {X} is consistent. Say X = Xn. Then S ∪ {Xn} is consistent
and so at stage n of the construction above, not only is Xn = X in Sn+1, but also X(t) is in Sn+1
for some justification term t, and hence X(t) is in S, so trivially S ∪ {X(t)} is consistent.
All results to this point have had the form: some set has the  instantiation property provided
some other set does. We do not yet know there are any such sets at all, except for inconsistent
ones. This is taken care of by the following Lemma and Proposition, but now the  closure of the
constant specification comes into play.
Lemma 5.10 Suppose we have a constant specification that is  closed. Let F be a consistent
finite set of S4LP formulas, and let X be a single formula with a designated occurrence of . Then
F ∪ {X ⊃ X(x)} is consistent, where x is a variable that does not occur in F or in X.
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Proof Assume the hypothesis, and also assume F ∪ {X ⊃ X(x)} is not consistent, where x does
not occur in F or in X. Then [
∧
F ∧ (X ⊃ X(x))] ⊃ ⊥ is provable. By Theorem 4.4 we also have
provability of {[∧F ∧ (X ⊃ X(x))] ⊃ ⊥}(x/), but this is just [∧F ∧ (X ⊃ X)] ⊃ ⊥, and it
follows that F is not consistent.
Proposition 5.11 Assume we have a constant specification that is  closed, Definition 4.3. If F
is a finite, consistent set of S4LP formulas then F can be extended to a consistent set that has the
 instantiation property.
Proof Enumerate the formulas of S4LP, X0, X1, X2, . . . . We define a chain F0, F1, F2, . . . of
consistent finite sets, as follows.
F0 = F .
Assume Fn has been defined. Consider formula Xn. Choose an occurrence of  in Xn and take
it to be designated (if there are none, this step is vacuous). Let x be a variable that does not occur
in the finite set Fn or inXn. Then Fn∪{Xn ⊃ Xn(x)} is consistent, by Lemma 5.10. Further extend
this set by consistently adding an instantiation implication for a different designated occurrence of
 in Xn, and so on until each designated occurrence has had a corresponding implication added.
Call the resulting set Fn+1. Clearly it is finite and consistent.
Finally, set F ∗ to be ∪nFn. Then F ∗ is consistent, and it is easy to see it will have the 
instantiation property.
Completeness for LP was proved in [8], and that proof was extended to S4LP, as usually for-
mulated, in [7]. Now we modify that proof to establish our main result, which we restate here for
convenience.
Theorem 5.3 Let C be a constant specification that is  closed (Definition 4.3). If Z0 is not
provable using this constant specification, then Z0 is false at some world of an S4LP model meeting
this constant specification and meeting the local realizability condition.
Proof Since Z0 is not provable, {¬Z0} is consistent. Using Proposition 5.11, this set extends to
a set that has the  instantiation property, and by Proposition 5.9, this further extends to a set
that is maximally consistent and has the  instantiation property. Call this set Γ0.
Construct a model as follows. Let G be the set of all maximally consistent sets of formulas that
have the  instantiation property. (Note that Γ0 ∈ G.) If Γ ∈ G, let Γ] = {X | X ∈ Γ}, and set
ΓR∆ if Γ] ⊆ ∆. This gives us a frame, 〈G,R〉. It is easily shown to be reflexive and transitive.
Define a mapping A by setting A(t,X) = {Γ ∈ G | t :X ∈ Γ}. Finally, define a mapping V by
specifying that for an atomic formula P , Γ ∈ V(P ) if and only if P ∈ Γ. This gives us a structure
M = 〈G,R,A,V〉. We begin by showing that M is an S4LP model.
First we verify that our candidate for an admissible evidence function, A, meets the · Condition.
Suppose we have Γ ∈ [A(s,X ⊃ Y ) ∩ A(t,X)]. By the definition of A, we must have t:X ∈ Γ
and s:(X ⊃ Y ) ∈ Γ. Since s:(X ⊃ Y ) ⊃ (t:X ⊃ (s · t):Y ) is an S4LP axiom, and Γ is maximally
consistent, it follows that (s · t):Y ∈ Γ, and hence Γ ∈ A(s · t, Y ).
Next we verify theR Closure Condition. Suppose Γ,∆ ∈ G and ΓR∆. Also assume Γ ∈ A(t,X).
By definition of A, we have t:X ∈ Γ. But t:X ⊃!t:t:X is an S4LP axiom, and so is !t:t:X ⊃ t:X, so
we have t:X ∈ Γ, and hence t:X ∈ Γ] ⊆ ∆. Then ∆ ∈ A(t,X).
Verifying that A meets the + and ! Conditions is similar, and is omitted. Likewise it is straight-
forward to check that M meets constant specification C.
We have now verified that M is an S4LP model.
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Next, a Truth Lemma can be shown: for each formula X and each Γ ∈ G
X ∈ Γ⇐⇒M,Γ  X (1)
Many of the cases are familiar from standard S4 completeness proofs. I’ll verify only one case.
Suppose (1) is known for X, and we are considering the formula t:X.
Suppose first that t:X ∈ Γ. Then, using the Connecting Axiom, t:X ⊃ X, X ∈ Γ, and so
X ∈ Γ]. Then if ∆ is an arbitrary member of G with ΓR∆ we have Γ] ⊆ ∆ and hence X ∈ ∆. By
the induction hypothesis, M,∆  X. Also since t:X ∈ Γ, we have Γ ∈ A(t,X). It follows that
M,Γ  t:X.
Next, suppose M,Γ  t:X. This case is trivial. As part of the definition of  we must have
Γ ∈ A(t,X), and by definition of A for M, we must then have t:X ∈ Γ.
Thus we have the Truth Lemma. It follows immediately that M meets the local realizability
condition. Here is the argument. Suppose M,Γ  X. Then by the Truth Lemma, X ∈ Γ.
Designate an occurrence of  in X. Since members of G have the  instantiation property, for
some t, Γ ∪ {X(t)} is consistent, hence X(t) ∈ Γ since Γ is maximal. If there are occurrences of 
in X(t) repeat this step, eliminating a second occurrence. And so on. When all occurrences of 
are gone, we have a realization X ′ of X, with X ′ ∈ Γ. But then M,Γ  X ′, by the Truth Lemma
again.
Finally, since ¬Z0 ∈ Γ0, and Γ0 ∈ G, we have M,Γ0 6 Z0, completing the proof.
It should be noted that we have not proved a semantic version of compactness. Essentially our
failure to do so comes down to the restriction that the set F be finite in Proposition 5.11.
6 Fully Explanatory
The LP semantics given in Section 2.2 was introduced in [6, 8] where two versions were given, weak
and strong. The weak version is basic in this paper. For the strong version, an additional condition
was placed on models. An LP model M = 〈G,R,A,V〉 was called fully explanatory provided, for
each world Γ ∈ G, if M,∆  X for every ∆ ∈ G such that ΓR∆, then M,Γ  t :X for some
justification term t. Strong models were defined to be weak models meeting the fully explanatory
condition. Completeness of axiomatic LP with respect to strong models was demonstrated, using
a proof that closely mirrored a central part of the usual proof of completeness for modal logics,
using canonical models. In the conventional modal case one shows that if {X1, . . . ,Xn,¬Y }
is consistent, then so is {X1, . . . , Xn,¬Y }. In the LP case one shows that, for fixed choice of t1,
. . . , tn, if {t1:X1, . . . , tn:Xn,¬u:Y } is consistent for every choice of u, then {X1, . . . , Xn,¬Y } is also
consistent.
As it happens, strong completeness and the fully explanatory condition have found no applica-
tions. In all applications of the LP semantics so far, the weak version has sufficed. Nonetheless, it
seems reasonable to suppose that an aspect of justification logics that is closely connected to such
a fundamental modal argument must play a significant role at some point. Perhaps this is wishful
thinking, but some wishful thinking has a degree of plausibility to it.
The reason the fully explanatory condition for LP comes up here is: the work of this paper
provides a second proof of strong completeness for LP, along completely different lines from that
referred to above. The argument follows.
Suppose X is a formula of LP, and X is not provable using a constant specification C that is
axiomatically appropriate (for LP axioms only, of course). It is simple to extend C to a constant
specification that is axiomatically appropriate for all of S4LP and is  closed; we leave it to you
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to check this. Call the extension C∗. Then X is not provable in S4LP using C∗ either, since an LP
counter model for X easily extends to an S4LP countermodel for X, using the weak notion of S4LP
model from [7]. Since X is not provable in S4LP using C∗, by the completeness proof of the present
paper, X is falsified at some world of an S4LP model meeting the local realizability condition. If
we ignore  in such a model we have an LP model, and local realizability immediately gives us the
fully explanatory condition.
It is curious that the fully explanatory condition can be approached from such seemingly dif-
ferent directions—via a generalization of a standard modal argument, and via a generalization of
a Henkin completeness argument. It is also curious that no use has been found for the condition.
This report ends on a note of genuine puzzlement.
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